Syria Monthly Report

Executive summary

International engagement

Cautious yet significant steps toward early recovery are beginning to emerge in Syria, after the Assad regime’s collapse in December 2024. Gulf governments are helping Syria re-engage with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while the UN Development Program (UNDP) is embarking on a plan to reinvigorate important industries. Still, the road to real stabilization is long and uncertain. Insufficient funds, sanctions, political unrest, and ineffective state institutions could easily stop progress. As a result, Syria’s recovery will be either gradual and inclusive or superficial and fragmented, depending on the early actions that are currently being taken. There were significant shifts in US policy toward Syria, developments that signal a potential improvement in the US administration’s relations with the new government. The US announced that it intends to reduce its military presence, members of the US Congress visited Damascus, and it eased diplomatic restrictions on members of the Syrian government. Although promising, these actions do not necessarily represent a breakthrough in US–Syrian relations. Rather, they are a sign of a conditional rapprochement against which the US repeatedly asserts that Washington is continuing “to monitor the behavior of the new Syrian government” before initiating any real change.

Security, governance, and political stability

The Eighth Brigade, a prominent former opposition armed group in Dar’a, dissolved in mid-April amid mounting pressure from both residents and Syria’s government. The group, a well-armed and organized force, had represented a potential threat to Damascus because, up until April, it had remained outside government control after the fall of Assad. An ill-judged and public assassination of a local rival in April led to public opinion turning against the Brigade, and with mounting pressure from security and defense authorities, it had no choice but to disband. Its dissolution will mean the government is likely now in a better position to maintain security in Dar’a, without significant challenge to its authority.

In Aleppo, the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) signed an agreement for the SDF to withdraw from the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods in Aleppo, placing them under government control. This agreement represents the first practical test of a larger agreement concluded between president Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF general commander Mazloum Abdi in March 2025.

New fault lines have begun to emerge in the post-Assad Syria, beyond sectarian and ethnic divisions. Social strains driven by political affiliation – past loyalties, transitional alignments, and new rivalries – are increasingly becoming a primary driver of localized violence and instability. Add to this the dissolution of the state’s monopoly over the use of force, and the emergence of a new environment where Syrians are increasingly taking justice into their own hands, and civil unrest becomes a real threat.

In northeast Syria, Arab groups and elites have established a new council to challenge what they claim is the “coercive domination” of the SDF. Seven political and civil entities, represented by the new Cooperation and Coordination Council in the Syrian Jazira and Euphrates, oppose the SDF’s influence over the political and administrative decision-making in northeast Syria. Support for the Council is unknown, and it could be that it is not just a localized civil announcement; it may represent a strategic shift in the internal balance of power in the region and in negotiations between the SDF and Damascus, which remains stalled amid intertwined local, regional, and international complications.

Economic stability

To mitigate the effects of the ongoing liquidity shortage, the Syrian government has introduced digital payments for public sector employee salaries. The Ministry of Finance directed public institutions to pay their employees through the Sham Cash electronic application (app), from May 2025. Employees are paid through the app and can then withdraw cash from contracted international monetary transfer agencies (IMTAs). This saves the government from having to make large cash payments and moves the responsibility for making direct payments from the cash-strapped banking sector to the IMTAs. Although Damascus needs the system to work to navigate cash shortages, data privacy and security concerns have been raised, as have questions over the legality of dealing with the unregistered app.

Infrastructure and services

Low rainfall, excessive consumption and unregulated borehole drilling pose a critical threat to water supply in Damascus, causing the city’s water directorate to declare a state of emergency and introduce rationing. Water supply to the city is reduced as water levels from its main water source, Ein El-Fijeh spring, are significantly decreased. The government has recognized the severity of the problem and has taken steps to make the existing supply last, however as drought conditions in Syria intensify, water shortages are likely to become a national problem.