Syria Monthly Report

Summary

Russia’s veto of the proposed 9-month extension of the UN cross-border mechanism into northwest Syria has left humanitarian organizations scrambling for an alternative. The Syrian government wrote directly to the UN Secretary-General with a proposed solution, which was accepted in early August. Details of the UN’s terms have not been released, however leaked letters reveal that the Syrian government set (largely unworkable) conditions that deliveries be carried out in full cooperation and coordination with Damascus, that the UN not communicate with “terrorist organizations” [opposition actors in the northwest] and their affiliates, and that the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent would run aid operations. With 4.1 million people in the northwest dependent on humanitarian support, and 85% of that support sent through Bab Al-Hawa, it is likely that access to aid from Turkey will serve as a major lever for the Syrian government to utilize in the medium term in negotiations with armed actors, Turkey, and the international community.

The further black market depreciation of the Syrian pound to an all-time low of SYP 13,300 per USD, coupled with collapsing provision of subsidized goods and electricity serve as symptoms of the economic struggles in government-held areas. New public-private partnerships to improve service infrastructure could be a positive initiative to try to fill the gaps in services, by injecting much-needed cash into the struggling sector. The wheat harvest, although up on 2022 levels, has fallen short of the government’s 1-million-tonne projections. The shortfall was blamed on competition from the Autonomous Administration, who bought over 1 million tonnes from northeast farmers. In Dar’a, the Syrian army has moved into Tafas city following clashes with a local armed group. The group, which is unpopular in the city for exacerbating tribal tensions, failed to garner local support.

In the northeast, shop owners are angry at the Autonomous Administration’s rising taxes. Protests were held in various cities, with minor concessions made to local policies. The Administration’s lack of ability to respond to civilian unrest is a problem, and could escalate if the economic situation continues to deteriorate. Conflict between the Deir-ez-Zor Military Council and the wider SDF threatens to destabilize city, undermining the SDF’s control over security within communities.

In the northwest, the SSG has dissolved local councils, and replaced them with a more centralized structure based on five municipal departments, while responsibilities for service provision have been passed on to the municipalities and to two private companies, Green Energy and E-Clean. The new structure could improve coordination between SSG departments, however also represent a shift away from political community engagement, with more power concentrated in SSG leadership. HTS has arrested a number of its own members, accusing them of espionage. Although the group has downplayed the level of the security breach, it outwardly appears to have been significant. Further arrests are expected.