Introduction

In each phase of the Syrian conflict, aid actors have had to adapt to programming disruptions and changes to access and authority. These have included further bureaucratic hurdles and risks of aid interference or diversion. The February earthquakes presented a tragically unique situation where similar issues could feasibly arise: both governing and aid actors alike were confronted with a surge in humanitarian need and a subsequent influx of foreign aid across different localities of northwest Syria. These developments posed heightened risks for aid interference while also testing local authorities’ capacity to coordinate amid greater needs and conflicting priorities.

In this third report in the Northwest Syria Series, Mercy Corps’ Crisis Analysis – Syria (CA – SYR, formerly HAT) aims to identify how – if at all – the earthquake impacted governing actors’ policies toward aid actors in northwest Syria. This research aims to understand how the environment for local aid governance in northwest Syria has changed since the earthquake. Through an assessment of processes, this report compares the bureaucratic environment for aid projects within areas controlled by the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in Idleb and the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) in northern Aleppo.

The SSG’s establishment of the Directorate for the Affairs of Earthquake Victims in Idleb presents a step in long-standing attempts by the SSG to further institutionalize its presence with international donors, although questions remain about the Directorate’s technical capacity and professionalism. In northern Aleppo, approaches by the SIG remain largely unchanged, presenting limitations in the SIG’s ability to react quickly and coherently to a drastic increase in need.

Key findings

• The Syrian Salvation Government’s establishment of the Directorate for the Affairs of Earthquake Victims has not yet affected any significant changes to the Ministry of Development and Humanitarian Affairs’ authority over earthquake response projects, but aims to centralize information and speed up data coordination.

• The Directorate’s information management approaches and technical capacity remain opaque. Poor practices with regard to data collection, verification, and analysis could present space for misrepresentation or misinterpretation of earthquake-related data that could impact the location, scope, or type of aid programming.

• In northern Aleppo, aid approval processes remain largely unchanged. However, the Syrian Interim Government’s reliance on authority from Turkey created delays in its immediate response to the earthquake, resulting in an uncoordinated approach and presenting additional space for favoritism within aid distribution.