Executive summary

Syria’s political and security landscape is entering a new and fragmented phase. Between March and April 2025, conflict dynamics revealed stark divergences across the country—both in the types of violence and in how the state engages with them. In the coastal region, an Alawite-led insurgency reflected residual loyalties to the Assad regime and raised community fears of marginalization under the new government. In contrast, sectarian clashes in Druze-majority areas of southern and central Syria were sparked by a viral voice recording deemed blasphemous, prompting state de-escalation efforts and public condemnation of sectarian incitement. Meanwhile, in the northeast, tactical cooperation between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus in Aleppo gave way to renewed tensions following Kurdish demands for decentralization—highlighting the fragile and uneven nature of political integration.

These episodes underscore a central reality: the current phase is not defined by a singular conflict, but by multiple, disconnected fault lines. Violence is now driven less by frontlines and more by identity, institutional mistrust, and political ambiguity. The government’s varied responses—from launching investigation committees to distancing itself from direct involvement—reflect both political calculation and the structural limits of authority in a fractured post-Assad state. Alongside these trends, persistent risks such as Israeli military operations, ISIS activity, displacement pressures, and localized violence continue to threaten Syria’s fragile stability.

Key Takeaways

• Divergent Conflict Tracks: Syria is experiencing multiple, localized conflict patterns, ranging from insurgency and sectarian violence to political friction between state and non-state actors. These are unfolding independently, without a unifying trajectory.

• Varying Government Responses: The state’s approach differs across regions and crises—direct military engagement in the coastal insurgency, moral and institutional messaging in the Druze areas, and pragmatic cooperation paired with hard red lines in the northeast. These responses reflect both political intent and capacity constraints.

• Localized Violence as a Persistent Threat: Even as national-level battlefronts recede, identity-based violence and communal clashes remain a destabilizing force. These forms of unrest are harder to predict and often trigger retaliatory cycles with broader regional implications.

• Enduring Spoilers and Structural Risks: Israeli airstrikes, ISIS attacks, and continued displacement—especially in Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor—remain key spoilers. These risks intersect with new political tensions and could escalate existing fault lines.

• Implications for Response Actors: NGOs and international partners must recalibrate their approaches to reflect Syria’s fragmented reality. This includes conflict-sensitive programming, deeper local engagement, and alignment with emerging transitional processes—without reinforcing divisions or bypassing state frameworks.